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ABSTRACT
An abstract of the thesis of Paul M. Slyman for the Master of Science in Geography

presented February 21, 1996.

Title: Oregon's Oil: A Geographic View of Petroleum Distribution and Associated
Risks

Since no local crude oil sources exist, every drop of petroleum consumed
in Oregon originates from outside sources and is distributed multi-modally to consumers.
As population continues to increase and oil sources dwindle, this reliance may add
financial and environmental risks to Oregonian' s quality of life. This paper examines
Oregon's oil distribution system, and analyzes the risks oil movements pose in the state.
A comprehensive understanding of oil distribution in Oregon can best be gained
geographically. Pipelines, ships, barges, railroads and trucks play different roles in this
system, yet data for these transport modes are maintained by different groups and
unstandardized. Therefore, the data must be normalized to present a map of how oil is
being moved around the state. This study sets all levels to a barrels (42 U.S. gallons) per
month (assumed 30 days) standard.
Oil's role in the economy of our state, most noticeably in the sale of motor
gasoline, creates different types of risk. The most obvious risk results from
transportation, and Oregon is plagued daily by unintended releases. A second type of
risk, supply risk, exists because of our reliance on the petroleum networks of Alaska,
Washington and California, and was evident during the 1974 oil embargo. Lastly,
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economic risk should theoretically be present since Oregon is a downstream consumer
from adjacent states. During times of shortages, Oregon should be at the mercy of those
who provide its supply. The data do not support this, but suggest that oil is purely a global
commodity, and price and supply are determined worldwide in response to typical
marketing forces.
The distribution systems detailed herein are dynamic, and outside forces such as
the proposed export of Alaskan crude oil, the increased exploration of offshore oil fields,
and the development of a cross-Cascades pipeline may alter this scheme. Oregonians can
ensure the most effective petroleum distribution systems only by understanding them and
their associated risks.

OREGON'S OIL: A GEOGRAPHIC VIEW OF PETROLEUM DISTRIBUTION
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by
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A comprehensive understanding of how oil is distributed to end users in Oregon
can best be gained through a geographic view. This study analyzes the oil distribution
systems within Oregon and evaluates the risks posed by those systems. No study of this
sort is presently available. Maps depicting the transportation types and corridors provide
holistic appreciation of how oil gets from its source to consumption.
This study begins with a look at where we get oil as a nation. Since the United
States consumes one fourth of the world's petroleum, we must remain cognizant of the
short and long term supplies. Texas is the major supplier of oil products to the United
States, and together with Alaska provides one third ofU. S. needs. California,
Louisiana, and Oklahoma provide the bulk of the remaining domestic supply. Imports,
which satisfy half of the U.S. petroleum demand, arrive chiefly from Latin America as
well as the Middle East.
The study' s focus then shifts to where we get oil as a state. Since the Oil
Producing Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil embargo of 1974, and the ensuing
development of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, Oregon has remained dependent on Prudhoe
Bay crude oil to quench its fossil fuel thirst. This Alaskan oil journeys through an 800
mile pipeline, then into super tankers bound for refineries in Washington and California.
Since there are no refineries within Oregon, eventually it makes its way here as a
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refined product traveling via pipeline, barge, self propelled vessel, or tank truck. These
incoming activities function as "inputs" to the state's oil budget. Once in Oregon, oil is
transported to gas stations, industries, marinas, homes, and many other places that rely
on petroleum as a source of primary or back up energy. These activities function as
"movements" to the state's oil budget.
This thesis quantifies these activities, and includes both volumes and number of
trips per transport mode. Some modes are readily quantified, while others are more
challenging. Separate chapters detail the roles performed by pipeline, ships, facilities,
tank trucks and railroads. The analysis follows the oil to the "tank truck level" of
detail. The oil is not observed to the ultimate level of a home, gas station, or
automobile.
Pipelines, which offer the biggest input, are easily counted, and their volumes
transported are often available in barrels per hour. Self propelled tank vessels, also
known as "supertankers," provided our only source of oil several decades ago, but now
visit Oregon only ten times monthly delivering almost one third of the state's need.
Tank barges play enormous roles by delivering specialty products from adjacent states,
providing bunker fuels to awaiting ships, and moving oils within the river system. Tank
trucks carry the smallest volumes but make by far the most frequent trips. Quantifying
the transportation patterns of these trucks is difficult, though a 1987 flow study
conducted by the Public Utility Commission sought to assess the movement of
hazardous materials within the state. Railroads are the only distribution mode not
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utilized. Although Oregon enjoys an elaborate rail system servicing many comers of
the state, rail is not employed in the oil transportation scheme. Reasons for this are
unclear, but most likely it is a function of the inexpensive alternative of using tank
trucks. As the population continues to increase, population centers change, or oil prices
increase, this rail system may figure more prominently in the future.
Risks, both economic and transportation, are evident in Oregon's oil budget,
with the transportation risks far more visible than the economic risks. The
transportation risks are quantified through several sources, and predominantly include
tank truck, ship and barge mishaps that lead to the spilling of oil. While these affect the
environment, this study shows that they are too small to influence the overall oil budget.
Price and supply risk should theoretically be present since Oregon is a
downstream consumer from adjacent states. During times of shortages or embargoes,
Oregon should be at the mercy of those who provide its supply. As such, any policies,
tariffs, or regulations upstream users impose on the oil industry should theoretically be
passed on to Oregonians in the form of price increases. Data support supply risk but not
price risk. Rather, data suggest that oil is purely a global market, and its price is
determined worldwide in response to typical marketing forces such as supply and
demand. Comparisons of West Coast prices to U.S. prices, as well as comparisons of
Oregon and Washington prices indicate that Oregon is at no greater economic risk than
other states during significant "petroleum related events" such as the Exxon Valdez spill
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or the Kuwait oil fires. Like anywhere, when significant petroleum related events
occur, or there is a perception that they will occur, prices tend to increase.

GLOBAL OVERVIEW

Oil and oil based products play tremendous roles in the economies of the world,
and particularly the United States. The United States, in 1992, consumed an average of
17,033,000 barrels per day, representing roughly 25% of the world total of 66,744,000
barrels per day. This was enough to provide every man, woman and child with
approximately 3 gallons daily. Japan came in a very distant second place with
5,454,000 barrels consumed, or less than one third the U. S. total for a per capita rate of
1.8 gallons per day (Energy Information Administration, International Energy Annual
1992, Table 8, January 1994). Further per capita comparisons not shown in this study
only serve to emphasize the heavy dependence on petroleum by American citizens.
Fortunately for the U.S., domestic sources of oil do exist. However, these
reserves are being methodically depleted, and the nation is becoming ever more
dependent upon outside sources. The following figure indicates there is little if any
correlation between the amount of petroleum a country consumes and the amount it
holds in reserves. Such a relationship makes it opportune for oil rich nations to export
their resources in attempts to develop economic parity.
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Figure 1. Geographic disparity between proven crude oil reserves and oil
consumption based upon 1990 figures (Sources: American Petroleum
Institute, Basic Petroleum Data Book Vol XIII, No. 3, Section II, Table
4, 9193, and Energy Information Administration, International Energy
Annual 1992, Table 8, January 1994).

This shows the geographic disparity between those that have oil and those that
need oil. The movement, or distribution, of this oil affects every country and state,
whether they are on the sending end (and subject to environmental or aggression
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factors), receiving end (and subject to economic factors), or just on the thoroughfare
(and perhaps subject to both).

OREGON OVERVIEW

Oregon, much like the United States, is a large consumer of petroleum products
in relation to its crude reserves. To date, Oregon has yet to establish one proven reserve
of crude oil, yet it continues to grow in population and increase the disparity between oil
usage and domestic supply. This increasing gap, with no corresponding domestic
supply, may increase stresses on the quality of life in Oregon.
Since no local crude sources exist, every drop of oil consumed in Oregon
originates from an outside source. This outside source is primarily the Alaska NorthSlope range, and the path the petroleum takes as it makes its way to Oregon consumers
is anything but direct. The oil is pumped from the earth near the Beaufort Sea, in 42"
steel piping across three mountain ranges, through the earth, and over permafrost,
eventually completing its 800 mile journey in Valdez, Alaska. This journey merely
serves to get oil to a position where it can be transported for refining. Oil in its natural
form (termed "crude oil") is of little use to consumers until it has been refined. It is
during the refining process that the raw material is transformed into its various fractions
that power modem machinery, including everything from lawn mowers to electrical
generation plants. This refining occurs in neighboring states, but not in Oregon.
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It is difficult to assess why Oregon has no refineries, however, Oregon is not
unique in this situation. While the majority of states do contain natural sources of crude

oil and refineries, densely populated New England is without both. Some states, such as
Washington, Hawaii, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Georgia, Delaware, and New Jersey, are
without crude oil but have do have refining capabilities. A few (Florida, Missouri,
Nebraska, and South Dakota) have sources of crude oil, but export that oil for refining.
This is becoming increasingly more important as states adopt taxation schedules such as
the nickel-per-barrel taxes enacted in Washington, Alaska, and California, which assess
a five cent tax on every barrel of crude oil entering their state.
Of states west of the Rocky Mountains, Oregon and Idaho are the only two
lacking both an oil source and refineries. Idaho has useful neighbors in Montana and
Utah which boast both substantial oil supplies and refining capability. Oregon, on the
other hand, has approximately three times the population of Idaho with no such adjacent
neighbors, as California has tremendous oil thirsts, and Washington must import all of
its crude.
Refineries locate in the vicinity of either supplies or markets (Lindsay, 1956),
and few refineries have been constructed since the 1950s and 1960s. With no major
population source, no nearby crude supplies, and restricted channel depth of the
Columbia River, Oregon was understandably bypassed in favor of Puget Sound when
refineries were constructed in the Northwest.
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CRUDE OIL EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION

It has been argued the greatest risk in the oil business is the financial risk to the
companies that make their livelihood in the industry. Oil exploration and production
involve risk, which can be simplified into: (1) finding oil; and (2) ensuring that the oil
is of a quality and quantity demanded by the prevailing market. Such financial risk is
not quantified in this study, but it does influence the global petroleum market.

Crude Oil Overview
Crude oil on Alaska's North Slope had been identified in the 1960s, but cheap
imports rendered extraction and production of this source unattractive. Adding to this
unattractiveness was the engineering challenge of transporting oil from Prudhoe Bay to
end users in the lower 48 states. Early into the 1974 OPEC price hikes, large oil
companies with the assistance of the U. S. government, elected to construct a pipeline
crossing the Brooks Range, the Alaska Range, and the Chugach Mountains. This
endeavor became the largest engineering feat of the decade, but unfortunately for U. S.
alternative energy policy, it also overshadowed the development of alternative fuels.
Like the United States, other nations have adopted efforts to secure supplies of nonOPEC crude in attempts to minimize their economic vulnerability. Naturally this forces
OPEC (whose share in world production dropped from 57 % in 1975 to 36% in 1990) to
examine ways to increase exports (Fellman, 1990).

9

Crude oil is a mixture of chemical compounds comprised of hydrogen and
carbon atoms ("hydrocarbons"), which must be separated to be made useful. The

unique characteristics of each of these compounds aid in their separation by a
distillation process. This process takes a batch of crude oil, heats it to a particular
temperature, and allows a portion to boil off. After awhile the boiling ceases and that
which has boiled off is collected. The temperature is then increased to the same batch
of crude until boiling recommences. This boil off is also collected, although separate
from the first step. The entire process continues, with the temperature applied to the
crude increased at each step, until only the heaviest product remains.
This distillation process (refining) serves to separate the crude at various "cut
points" corresponding to the temperatures at which they boiled. Although all crude oils
differ, typical cut points provide products such as:
90°F

propane and butane

90°F~

220°F

gasoline

220°F~

315°F

napth a

315°F~

450°F

kerosene

450°F~

650°F

gas oil

650°F~

800°F

heavy oil

800°F

residue

These products can be blended, or used directly in the capacity they are needed.
Based upon the crude oil, large percentages of light, and generally more expensive,
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products may be distilled. These are referred to as "light crudes" as opposed to "heavy
crudes" containing a larger percentage of the heavy fractions which supply a greater
proportion of the residual and gas oils favored by industrial users. Approximately three
fourths of crude refined in the United States is turned into light distillates such as motor
gasoline.

Refinery Overview
Rather than refine the crude oil in Alaska, then export the finished products, the
industry prefers to construct refineries near the end user. Like any bulk industry,
transportation of a uniform product (e.g. crude oil) can be achieved more easily and
cheaper than transportation of many products (e.g. kerosene, gasoline, and diesel). The
logistics of separating cargoes and delivering specific cargoes to specific locations can
increase costs. Furthermore, crude oil supplies from any given locale are finite.
Therefore, although refineries situated in Alaska may be able to refine crude supplies
from all over the world, a local market for their output may not always exist. In this
sense, refineries exploit a particular crude source, and upon its depletion, look for crude
sources elsewhere to fuel their operations. Should the replacement crude source differ
substantially from the initial crude source in chemical composition, the refinery adjusts
to provide the appropriate final products.
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Distribution Overview
For off-site refining, crude oil is shipped in large ocean going ships known as
super tankers. Along the West Coast, these tankers deliver their cargo from Valdez to
refineries in Southern California, Northern California, and Puget Sound. The Southern
Californian refineries are centered in Long Beach and import crude supplies from
Alaska, as well as off the California Coast. The Northern California (San Francisco
Bay) and Puget Sound refineries are adjusted primarily to accept Alaskan crude.
Once these crude oils are refined into consumable products, they are distributed
to the market. This distribution includes the use of self-propelled tankers, barges,
railroads, trucks, and pipelines in various combinations. Oregon relies on the use of all
but railroads to distribute bulk petroleum.

SEARCH FOR CRUDE OIL SOURCES IN OREGON

With the boom in oil usage in the early 1900s, many states quickly realized that
securing a stable source of crude would be in their financial interests. Oregon saw
abundant oil being produced in California and initiated studies to secure a supply of
crude within its borders.

Overview
When searching for petroleum, geologists first look for oil seeps. Since oil is
generally lighter than water, any underground sources of oil float on the groundwater,
and have a tendency to make their way to the surface. Oil seeps in any of the petroleum
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regions of the world have been known of and talked about by local inhabitants centuries
before the development of petroleum. Seeps in California were known to the Native
Americans long before the arrival of white and Spanish settlers.
Given a lack of oil seeps, geologists look for favorable conditions to indicate
presence of underground petroleum. First, for any region to be productive, it must have
beds that can be a source of petroleum. Such beds must be porous enough to hold the
oil and yet when tapped must allow oil to flow to a well. Beds of impervious material
must overlay this reservoir so as to prevent too much upward movement of the oil.
Folding of these beds into synclines and anticlines allows petroleum to concentrate in
the tops of domes, thus easing extraction.

Oregon Oil Exploration on Land
Exploration for oil in Oregon began in earnest in 1902, when A.C. Churchill
drilled two wells near Newberg, and was rewarded with a small flow of non-flammable
gas. For the following two decades, over 40 wells were drilled, the largest of which was
in Ontario when gas forced sand and mud to be blown all over the drilling derrick.
After World War I, another 45 more wells were drilled, none of which produced.
Following World War 11, and the escalating demand for motor gasoline, major
companies (Phillips, Richfield, Texaco) began to invest in Oregon. Again, their
searches revealed no commercially viable quantities (Olmstead, 1989).
Oil Exploration in Western Ore2on. Geologists formerly believed that Western
Oregon was largely made of rock formations of similar geologic age to the successful
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oil districts of Southern California. In 1919, the Oregon Bureau of Mines and Geology
(now termed the "Oregon Department of Geology and Mineral Industries")
optimistically commissioned a study to determine oil presence in the western portion of
the state.
Four transects were completed from the coast to the Cascade Range to
determine the geologic structure of the region and predict the potential for oil. Surveys
were distributed to local residents to determine the presence of natural seeps, which
would offer quick indications of petroleum. Eaton & Arthur ( 1920) reported a large
natural seep in the North Fork of the Yamhill River, and found clear oil floating on the
water's surface. Samples were taken and analyzed to contain 2% foreign matter (water,
insects, and dead leaves), with the remaining 98% analyzed as kerosene of the
commercial grade "lantern oil". This seep was apparently either a hoax or Oregon's
first recorded oil spill.
The study failed to give any encouragement that Western Oregon would have
areas in which petroleum exists in commercial quantities. One geologist, Chester
Washburne, theorized, "As the surface ofrocks of this region are generally saturated
with circulating groundwater that reaches the surface in the rainy season, it is not
unreasonable to think that the water has washed out all of the free oil of the rock than
can be removed by water displacement" (Eaton & Harrison, 1920, p. 25). In other
words, the heavy precipitation in this region may have washed out any free oil. In
California, oil regions are not broken by volcanic intrusions as are found in Oregon.
The lack of satisfactory geologic indications such as confirmed oil seeps, and the
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generally broken conditions of formations, led researchers to dismiss any comparisons
with Southern California's oil rich terrain.
Leasing and drilling increased in the late 1960s and culminated with a
commercial gas discovery in 1979 near Mist in Columbia County. Subsequent drilling
resulted in the discovery of additional pools of gas. A pipeline connecting these fields
to a regional natural gas distribution network was completed by Northwest Natural Gas
in 1980, and although this was not as valuable as petroleum, it marked the beginning of
domestic gas production in Oregon. Exploration continues for additional fields in many
parts of the state, yet viable quantities of petroleum have yet to be found.
Oil Exploration in Eastern Oregon. A study was conducted in Eastern Oregon
in the 1920s led by Yale geologist John Buwalda. This plateau region is underlain by
volcanic rocks in the form of lava flows and interstratified tuff and volcanic ash beds.
These lavas made their way to the surface from fissures and after their deposition, they
were warped, folded, and faulted.
Buwalda examined 15 separate regions of Oregon east of the Cascade range.
The districts included the Columbia River Gorge, The Dalles, Dufur, Pendleton, John
Day, Blue Mountains, La Grande, Prineville, Hamey Valley, Beulah, Bend, Klamath
Falls, Lakeview, SE Oregon, and Ontario. Drilling for oil had already been
accomplished in the Dalles, Dufur, Bums, Klamath Falls, and Ontario. These wells had
struck small quantities of gas, but all quickly dissipated. Traces of oil had been reported
but no verifiable quantities in which crude was brought to the surface existed.
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Buwalda (1921) concluded that Eastern Oregon was also an "improbable"
source of crude oil. His judgment was based upon the absence of typical oil seeps, the

freshwater origin of the sedimentary strata, the volcanic nature of rocks underlying the
sediment, and perhaps most importantly, the many failures to locate oil.

Oil Exploration Offshore Ore~on
During the 1960s and 1970s, exploration continued onshore and extended
offshore for the first time. Major oil companies completed seismic work and elected to
drill eight offshore wells. In 1964, leases were made for state and federal property off
Oregon's coast. The eight wells, like their many onshore counterparts, again discovered
no commercially viable quantities of crude. After several years and $75,000,000, the
leases were dropped in favor of onshore leases (Olmstead, 1989).

STUDY METHODOLOGY

Oil is seldom found where it is consumed. On a global scale, this was
demonstrated in Figure l of this report. On a nationwide scale, Alaska represents a
superb demonstration. Having the greatest amount of crude oil reserves (when the
Arctic National Wildlife refuge is included), Alaska has not only the lowest overall
consumption, but at 270 stations, also the fewest number of gasoline outlets. Oregon,
with five times the population, has almost 2000 gas stations and consumes about five
times more petroleum. Delivering petroleum from the fields to the consumers, or
source to use, is where distribution becomes important.
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The following chapters detail this distribution system in Oregon. Pipelines,
ships, barges, facilities, railroads and trucks all play different roles in this system, yet
these roles are nowhere clearly articulated. Data for these transport modes are
maintained by different groups and unstandardized, and hence drive the presentation of
this report. Pipelines and facilities are stationary components of the system and
chapters detailing them are largely textual. Ships, barges and trucks are moving
components of the system and their chapters are primarily graphs. The data for all
chapters must be normalized to present a useful picture of how oil is being moved
around the state. This study sets all levels to a barrels (42 U.S. gallons) per month
(assumed 30 days) standard to allow for meaningful comparisons.
Data used for this study came from many sources, primarily the federal and state
governments. For most of the analysis, data for the three year period 1992-94 were used
as they were not only available and recent, but also provided a convenient comparison
to data for the 1974 oil embargo. Since Oregon is neither a major population center, nor
a major market in the petroleum industry, much of the data that is available for other
states was unavailable for Oregon.
This study places numbers both on the volumes in each of the processes and the
frequency of occurrences. Consumption of oil (perhaps termed "outputs") is not
analyzed. The analysis is conducted around "inputs" and ''movements" of oil, which
represent the distribution system at work in Oregon.

CHAPTER II

OIL PIPELINES IN OREGON

OVERVIEW

Pipelines serving Oregon in varying capacities provide the single largest input to
the oil budget. These include pipelines which import oil from outside the state,
pipelines which move oil within the state, and a pipeline which passes through the state
without providing oil. They therefore serve the dual roles of inputs and movements to
Oregon's oil budget.
The lack of any east-west oriented mountain ranges in the western portion of
Oregon aids petroleum distribution. The Willamette Valley provides a flat, stable
surface with minimal topographic relief for pipelines originating in Puget Sound
terminating in Portland and Eugene. This network allows for 60% of Oregon's annual
oil consumption to enter the state and transfer to the many tank farms situated along the
lower Willamette River.
For pipelines to figure into Oregon's oil budget, they must bridge the gap
between supply at one end and demand at the other. For example, the Olympic pipeline
offers the refined petroleum from the Puget sound region to Portland and the
surrounding area. The Santa Fe Pacific Pipeline offers a similar service to Eugene. The
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Chevron Utah pipeline, on the other hand, merely passes through the northeastern
corner of Oregon without loading or discharging. A summary of the pipelines and their

characteristics follows:

TABLE I
OIL PIPELINES OPERATING IN OREGON

Name

Petroleum Pipelines Operating in Oregon
Origin
Destination Capacity Tanks Storage

Olympic
Puget Sound Portland
Eugene
Santa Fe Pacific Portland
Chevron
Portland
PDX Airport
Umatilla
Hinkle
Kaneb
Pasco
Chevron
Boise
notes:
Capacity is listed in barrels per day.
Tank storage is listed in
barrels.

140000
52200
7500
10,000
32000

2
15
na
2
0

Products

4000 Various
83388 Gas, Diesel
na Jet fuel
52000 diesel
0 Various

The pipelines fill specific niches in the transportation needs of the state. Some
provide tremendous amounts of product on a continuous basis, while others are used
only sporadically.

Olympic Pipeline
No doubt the largest, and most sophisticated pipeline serving Oregon, the
Olympic pipeline began initial construction in 1965 to link refineries in the north Puget
Sound area to bulk oil facilities around Portland. All operations are remotely controlled
through the Renton control center which operates 24 hours a day.
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Olympic receives products directly from four refineries--Arco at Cherry Point,
British Petroleum at Ferndale, and Shell and Texaco at Anacortes. The system consists
of various size mainlines in its upper stretches, then a 14 inch mainline to complete its
journey from Renton to Portland. Along its almost 400 mile route, the pipeline supplies
the cities of Seattle, Tacoma, Tumwater, Vancouver, Linnton, and Portland. The SeaTac Airport also receives product from this line.
Products are moved through this pipeline at a rate of four miles per hour by
pumping stations located in the Washington cities of Allen, Woodinville, Renton,
Spanaway, Vail, and Castle Rock. Once in Oregon, the pipeline supplies many facilities
with various products including premium gasoline, regular gasoline (leaded and
unleaded), jet fuel, diesel fuel, and heating oil. In Linnton, deliveries are made from the
14 inch mainline into tankage owned by GATX. At the Portland Delivery Facility,
deliveries are made from the 14 inch mainline directly to Arco and Time Oil terminals
and to Shell, Chevron, Union, McCall and Texaco terminals through manifold valves
(Olympic Pipeline Spill Contingency Plan, 1993).
The capacity of this pipeline is 144,000 barrels per day, and it typically operates
at full capacity (Personal conversation w/ Olympic Pipeline Company, August 1995).

Santa Fe Pacific Pipeline
The Portland area reception stations described above also function as delivery
stations for the Santa Fe Pacific pipeline stretching from Portland to Eugene. Eight
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separate transfer lines (one from each facility) meet at the pipeline's Portland Pump
Station, where a single eight inch line begins its 115 mile southward journey.

Remote control pump stations exist in Fargo, Salem, and Morgan, with
distribution terminals operating in Albany and Eugene. The capacity of this pipeline is
52,000 barrels per day, although it more typically averages 35,000 barrels per day, of
which 2,000 barrels is taken off in Albany (ODOE, 1992).

Chevron Utah Pipeline
The Chevron Utah Pipeline, built in 1951, crosses the northeastern comer of
Oregon on its journey from Salt Lake City, Utah, to Pasco, WA. The crude for this
pipeline originates in the Rangely Oil Field in northwestern Colorado, and
approximately 34,000 barrels per day are collected and pumped to the Chevron refinery
in north Salt Lake. The Salt Lake to Pasco system is comprised of four segments: Salt
Lake - Boise segment (lines 1 and 2), Pocatello lateral segment, and Boise - Pasco
segment.
The Salt Lake - Boise segments run parallel and are distinguished merely by
their products carried. Line #1 carries diesel fuels, heating oil and jet fuel. Line #2
carries regular, unleaded, and supreme gasolines. These are both eight inch pipelines
spanning 320 miles.
The Pocatello segment similarly consists of an eight inch line traveling 5 5 miles
from Boise to Pocatello. Oil is stored here by bulk facilities operated by four shippers
who truck it to local destinations.
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The Boise - Pasco segment consists of 240 miles of eight inch pipe carrying all
grades of petroleum products from the Boise storage facilities to the Pasco marine
terminals. From Adams, OR, to Pasco, the line is looped , which adds an additional 80
miles of six inch line to the capacity (Chevron Pipeline Prevention Plan, 1993).
Although this pipeline severs the northeast comer of Oregon from Ontario to
Pendleton, no product is currently taken off this pipeline in the state. Terminals were
once located in Baker City and Adams. Because of dwindling demand, the Baker
terminal has been removed and the Adams terminal has remained unused since
September, 1990 (ODOE, 1992).

Chevron Airport Pipeline
The Chevron Airport Pipeline replaces a railroad depot connection and tank
truck deliveries that used to provide the jet fuel necessary for airport operation.
Constructed in 1971, it travels from the Chevron distribution facility in Portland nine
miles to the Portland International Airport. The pump station consists of a single pump
with metering facilities, and there are three sets of intermediate control valves for the
eight inch line (Chevron Oil Spill Contingency Plan, 1993). The daily operation of
this pipeline moves approximately 5,700 barrels eliminating 24 daily tank truck trips to
the airport.

Kaneb Pipeline
The Kaneb Pipeline Operating Partnership owns a four and a half inch line
carrying diesel fuel from the Tidewater Barge Lines Umatilla terminal to Union Pacific
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Railroad's yard in Hinkle. Tidewater barges fill the 42,000 barrel tank in Umatilla
where the diesel is then piped to a 10,000 barrel storage tank owned by the railroad to
power its locomotives. This pipeline was constructed in 1979.
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RISK FROM OIL PIPELINES

Environmental Risk
Pipelines are often considered the safest mode of petroleum transport when
evaluating the enormous volumes they move as compared to the number of spills
occurring. In Oregon this has particularly been true with only one spill over forty two

gallons reported since 1988. A worldwide view does not paint the same favorable
picture. Worldwide spill data for 1994 reveals that of the 25 largest releases, I 0 were
from pipelines. The remaining 15 were from self propelled vessels, barges, and bulk oil
facilities combined. These pipeline spills are often the result of an outside action such
as digging, or flooding, as was the case in the many Houston pipeline spills last year.
However, the 1995 catastrophic pipeline spill in Russia, which has still not been
quantified, is theorized to be the result of poor engineering and maintenance.
Oregon is not without its pipeline risk. The Olympic pipeline from Puget Sound
passes underneath the Columbia River near Sauvie Island, approximately I 00 yards
from two natural gas pipelines. Although buried to a depth of twelve feet where
possible, the line is subject to ships anchoring directly above. The area directly above
this burial is not a designated anchorage. However, vessels prefer it for its wide berth
and convenience to the many terminals in Portland and Vancouver, and they often
anchor nearby. Given the combination of the strong Columbia River currents, coupled
with the sandy substrate, the opportunity for anchors to drag is evident. Such dragging
could easily damage the pipeline, causing a rupture and subsequent release. Fortunately
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the pipeline has remotely operated valves from its Renton, Washington, control center
which could be secured in such an event. However, the valves must be closed
sequentially, and it takes approximately ten minutes to follow the sequence. At a
pumping rate of 144,000 barrels per day, the absolute minimum amount of product lost
from a rupture to this pipeline would allow 42,000 gallons of product to be released.
The Santa Fe Pacific, Kaneb, and Chevron Airport pipelines also provide
environmental risk. These lines move significantly smaller quantities of petroleum than
the Olympic Pipeline, and are not buried in way of ship anchorages. Spills from them
would most likely result from unauthorized digging or movements of the earth's crust.
The Chevron Utah pipeline, traversing the northeastern edge of Oregon, presents
risk with no benefit. The 32,000 barrels per day pumping through this line present an
exposure to Oregon natural releases, but offer no benefit since all the product is destined
for Washington.

Economic Risk
Petroleum pipelines are regulated federally by the Department of Transportation
Research and Special Projects Administration (DOT-RSPA). Any changes to these
regulations would apply universally and consequently place the states on equal footing
for economic risk. Along the West Coast, state regulations are also enforced for spill
prevention and response. These regulations require extensive planning, equipment
purchases and exercising and increase the operating costs of the pipelines. Since the
federal regulations apply universally, and West Coast states all maintain similar
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regulations, economic risk is not readily evident. However, since the Olympic pipeline
provides Oregon with 60% of its needed petroleum, any extended delays in operation

would have severe economic effects on the oil supply network.
A proposal has been made to establish a pipeline crossing the North Cascade
Mountain Range near Ellensburg, Washington, to provide the Pasco, Washington, area
with petroleum. The present schedule has the pipeline securing necessary permits and
rights-of-way over the next eighteen months, then completing construction during the
following year. Initial output of the pipeline is scheduled for 65,000 barrels per day.
While this pipe does not enter Oregon, it does present ramifications to the shipping
industry. As described in the following chapter, 65 barge trips upriver to Pasco occur
monthly. These trips will all but be eliminated by the construction and operation of the
pipeline, which will significantly hamper the economic viability of the Columbia River
petroleum barging industry. Not as readily apparent, but also a threat, will be the
ramifications to the tank vessels calling on Portland. As the cross Cascades pipeline
goes into operation, it will free up capacity of the existing Olympic pipeline by allowing
product to be transported directly to Pasco, rather than to Portland and then to Pasco.
This change allows Olympic to send more Portland-destined product through the
existing pipeline, which will reduce the need for outside shipments.
Given the global nature of the petroleum industry, these pipeline developments
will most likely not be offset by a price decrease for petroleum users in the Pasco area.
Therefore, the economic risk primarily takes the form of lost jobs with the decline of the
upriver petroleum barging fleet.

CHAPTER III

SHIPPING IN OREGON

OVERVIEW

Large quantities of oil are moved by vessels in Oregon's waters, which includes
both self propelled and non-self propelled (barge) vessels. These watercraft function in
the roles of both inputs and movements to the distribution system. Oregon does not
receive the crude-carrying super tankers similar to the familiar Exxon Valdez, but
instead receives much smaller vessels carrying refined products from Puget Sound,
Northern California, and Southern California.
The Columbia River, with its dredged depth of 40' limits the size of oil tankers
desiring entrance, and necessitates the use of smaller tankers which transport products
from refineries in Puget Sound or Northern California. The riverbed is primarily sandy
which allows for the occasional tanker grounding without the risk of catastrophic spills.
On the coast, deepwater ports exist in Coos Bay and Y aquina Bay. Coos Bay
uses this capability to perform the role of petroleum distribution hub within its region,
and is served by large oceangoing tank barges entering two to three times monthly.
Yaquina Bay has failed to secure any waterborne oil distribution service, and uses its
deepwater port capability to receive occasional lumber ships.
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The basaltic Cascade Mountain Range cuts a north-south boundary dividing the
western one third of Oregon and Washington from their remaining portions to the east.
Crossing this range has historically been treacherous, and were it not for the presence of
the Columbia River Gorge, oil transport and distribution would be significantly
hampered. The Gorge serves as the only sea level east-west crossing of the Cascade
Range, and as such it has enabled barge traffic to supply the inland portions of Oregon
with needed petroleum. Other river limitations include the presence of the Oregon City
Falls, located near West Linn on the Willamette. These falls prevent commercial
vessels from provisioning upriver portions of the Willamette.
Typically, the super tankers carrying crude oil travel from Valdez, Alaska, to
one of the three destinations mentioned above for refining. Following the refining
process, smaller product-carrying tankers move the oil up and down our west coast to
the distribution facilities. Far smaller than the 1,000,000 barrels carried in the super
tankers, these coastal tankers typically hold 300,000 barrels since the depth of the
Columbia River (maintained to 40 feet) does not allow tankers of greater size to enter.
Occasionally super tankers in need of repair enter the Columbia to proceed to the Swan
Island Ship Repair yard, but do so very carefully in an unloaded condition.
Oil moved into Oregon on barges is done on large ocean going barges, which
can often load 75,000 barrels. These barges typically move heavy fuel oils since such
products cannot be transferred by the Olympic pipeline. Once oil is to be distributed
inside the river system, it is transferred to other smaller barges. Such barges average
15,000 barrels capacity for those used to transfer propulsion fuels to awaiting vessels
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and 40,000 to 50,000 barrels capacity for those used to transfer from facility to facility.
The distinction between these transportation patterns is discussed later.

SELF PROPELLED TANKERS

The self propelled tankers function as an input to Oregon's oil budget. These
tankers generally operate in a "liner route," meaning they routinely travel between
scheduled ports. Occasionally, "tramp" tankers, which operate whenever they can find
a job, visit Oregon, although not as frequently as the liner trade.
The tankers calling on the Columbia River and the coast travel between
refineries in California and Washington to deliver products. Those coming from
California supplement the minute amount of products imported via truck from the south.
Those coming from Washington augment the majority of product input which flows
from the Olympic Pipeline. On rare occasions, a crude carrying tanker visits from
South America to supply stock to the asphalt plants operated by Chevron Products
Company on the lower Willamette River.
As the following graph depicts, tanker visits to Oregon average roughly ten
monthly, all to the Columbia River area. Self propelled tankers have not called upon
Coos Bay since August 1993. This corresponded with the implementation of federal
response requirements which were followed the passage of the Oil Pollution Act of
1990, an amendment to the Clean Water Act. These requirements necessitated the
purchase and maintenance of oil spill recovery equipment in Coos Bay. Rather than
fund such a response organization, industry elected to cease deliveries by self propelled
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tankers. Product has since been delivered two to three times monthly via oceangoing
barge.
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Figure 3. Destination of self propelled oil tankers in Oregon 1992-94.
Coos Bay has not received a tanker since the implementation of the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 (Source: DEQ vessel movement data 1992-94).

Based upon these 10 monthly visits, average tanker traffic to the Columbia River
equals approximately 100,000 barrels daily, as compared to almost 200,000 barrels
daily from the Olympic Pipeline. However, the speed with which oil is moved by these
vessels, while slow, is about three times that of the pipeline.
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OIL BARGES

Barges function as both inputs and movements to Oregon's oil budget. Large
oceangoing barges move products into the state's waters. Hauling smaller specialty
shipments that would not warrant a full self propelled tanker, these barges routinely
travel from ports in northern and southern California, as well as Puget Sound. Oil
budget movements are accomplished by barges that operate entirely within the river
system and are not engaged in a coastwise trade.

Oil Inputs by Ban~e
Barges providing inputs to Oregon are generally large ocean going barges
operated by one of five barge companies, all of which are headquartered on the West
Coast. Although the origin of these barge trips fluctuates over time, overall they are
split evenly between Oregon and Washington.
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4. Origin of oil barge inputs to Oregon. Refined products are
moved from Washington and California into Oregon ports (Source:
DEQ vessel movement data 1992-1994).
An examination of the percentages gives a clearer picture of the fluctuations

between California and Washington originated shipments.
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More predictable than the origin of these barges, is the cycle they follow in their
deliveries shown in the following graph. The majority of vessels calling on the
Columbia River versus Coos Bay obviously corresponds to the demand of these two
geographic areas. On a monthly average, Coos Bay receives just 33,000 barrels of oil
by barge, while the Columbia River receives 240,000 barrels (U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, Waterborne Commerce User Statistics, 1993).
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A comparison of the "Origin" and "Destination" information reveals that Coos
Bay receives 79% of its barge shipments from Washington, 7% from California, and
14% from the Columbia River. The Columbia River, on the other hand, receives 48%
of its barge shipments from Washington and 52% from California. This is curious
considering geographically Coos Bay is closer to California than is the Columbia River.
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The primary explanation for Coos Bay's traffic is one of contractual arrangements.
Coos Bay facilities have a business relationship with oil suppliers in Puget Sound, and
therefore originate their shipments in Washington. While this ensures Coos Bay a
reliable source of oil, it renders them more vulnerable, and hence at greater risk, to
Washington energy policies and availability than is the Columbia River.

Oil Movements by Barge
Once oil is within Oregon, it is transported through the Columbia River system
by various barge fleets. This transport generally serves two purposes: to move product
from one facility to another, and to move product from a facility to an awaiting ship. In
Coos Bay, very few movements occur. Once product is at the facilities, it generally is
moved to tank trucks for distribution. In the Portland area, the movements are more
complex as product is moved upriver to supply the upper Columbia and Snake Rivers'
needs, and downriver to supply commercial ships needing propulsion fuel.
Upriver movements exist to provide oil supplies to facilities lying outside the
Portland metropolitan area. Oil distribution facilities exist in Umatilla, Oregon, TriCities, Washington, and Clarkston, Washington, and use this barged oil to supply parts
of eastern Oregon, Washington, and Idaho.
Historically, mariners brought oil barges upriver to supply these facilities, and
grain barges downriver to supply the silos on the lower Columbia. Such trade routes
necessitated an empty load at least one direction since grain and petroleum could not be
loaded into the same tanks. Eventually, a combination barge was developed by local
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shippers that allowed oil to be carried in lower tanks during the upriver transit, and then
grain to be carried in an upper hopper during the downriver transit. Such an
arrangement allowed the barge to maintain earning capacity during a round trip journey,
and served to keep prices of both commodities low.
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, passed in the wake of the Exxon Valdez spill,
requires oil barges to be fitted with double hulls. This requires an inner hull that carries
the oil, and an outer hull that serves as a void space between the vessel and the water.
This requirement has rendered the combination barge, which efficiently served the
Columbia River since the 1950s, unfeasible. Therefore, combination barges are
methodically being replaced by large double hulled oil barges to move petroleum
upriver, and hopper-configured barges to move grain downriver.
The following graph depicts the principal destinations for upriver transits of oil.
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Figure 7. Upriver destinations for barges departing from Portland 19921994. These movements supplement the oil flowing to these locations
through the Chevron-Utah pipeline (Source: DEQ Vessel Movement
Data 1992-1994 ).
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On average, this represents 65-70 trips per month, or more than two daily. The
majority of trips are from Portland to Pasco, although about one trip occurs from
Portland to Umatilla every two days, which has one oil distribution facility serving
trucks and rail. The rail segment of this facility consists of a pipeline feeding a 10,000
gallon storage tank at the Hinkle rail yard. The remainder of the product stays at a tank
farm for eventual distribution via truck. Barge trips to Pasco supply the Chevron and
Tidewater tank farms, which also receive inputs from the Chevron Utah pipeline
described earlier.
Occasionally barges move from Pasco downriver to the Portland area. These
barges transport products from the Chevron pipeline-supplied facilities and provide
them to the Portland facilities. Shipments such as these usually occur because of the
need for specialized products only available through the Chevron pipeline, although,
occasionally these shipments occur because of price differentials between the Chevron
Pipeline and the petroleum supplies coming in to Portland (Personal communication
with Tidewater Barge Lines, March 1995).
Barges also provide "bunker" fuel to ships visiting Oregon's waters.
"Bunkering" is an historical term derived from large coal storage compartments known
as ''bunkers" on early powered ships. Today the term generally refers to the refueling
process on self propelled vessels. Ships receiving bunkers play a significant role as a
"movement out of state" to Oregon's oil budget. This role is primarily limited to heavy
fuels, which are less costly, have high BTU (British Thermal Units), and are burned in
ships' boilers or engines.
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In Oregon, ships receive bunker fuel either in Coos Bay or the Columbia River.
Yaquina Bay, although a deep draft port, does not have the facilities to support a
bunkering operation. Therefore, cargo ships calling on Yaquina Bay must also visit
other ports to refuel. In Coos Bay, approximately three vessels receive bunker fuels
monthly, and this has fluctuated over time. In recent years, the Columbia River has
experienced a significant decline in vessels receiving fuel.
The 1992, 1993, and 1994 monthly average number of vessels receiving fuel
were 100, 85, and 75 respectively. Considering each vessel receives 6,761 barrels of
fuel, the decline represents a significant alteration to the overall oil budget. The number
of vessels receiving bunkers appear independent of the overall trend of ships visiting the
Columbia River, which has remained relatively unchanged, and perhaps slightly
increased, over time. Data from 1992-94 indicate that the average number of vessels
calling on the Columbia River has remained steady at 170 per month. Therefore, rather
than the 58% of vessels receiving bunkers in 1992, we presently experience only 44%.
The 25 vessels not receiving fuel represents 169 ,025 barrels, or 7,099 ,050 gallons of
fuel monthly. At $.80 per gallon, this amounts to $5,679,240 monthly. Industry
reasons for this decline generally point to heightened regulatory oversight on such
operations. However, Oregon has no specific rules pertaining to the receiving or
delivering of bunker fuels which would serve to increase their cost. The environmental
will of the public is strong, however, and spills from ships receiving fuel are not
tolerated. Therefore, this risk perception may be enough to deter ships from loading

..
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bunkers. The availability of low cost fuels in Singapore and Mexico probably cuts into
the Columbia River's market more than any environmental issue.
Despite this, it is interesting to note the healthy role Oregon does play in vessel
bunkering. Nationwide figures from 1992 indicate that Oregon ranks a respectable
seventh in states providing bunkers to vessels with 289,667,000 gallons (6,896,833
barrels) transferred. This follows the other west coast states with California leading the
nation at 1,463,396,000 gallons (34,842,762 barrels) and Washington at 1,038,944,000
gallons (24,736,760 barrels) (National Petroleum News, Mid-June 1994). California
and Washington both have huge shipping ports. By comparison, Oregon receives a
small number of ship visits and ranked just twenty-second in total ship activity for 1993.
California ranked third and fifth respectively (U.S. Army Corps, Waterborne
Commerce User Statistics 1993). Therefore, compared to other states, Oregon barge
and oil companies are seizing the opportunity to provide bunkering services to a large
percentage of the commercial vessel traffic.
In Coos Bay, vessels receiving fuels do so at any terminal they are berthed.
Along the Columbia River, vessels receiving bunker fuels do so at three principal
stretches. These geographic locations are Astoria, Longview, PortlandN ancouver.
Vessels receive the bunker fuels at these locations because they must either be moored
or at anchor prior to receiving fuels, and these locations provide such services. Given
the choice, vessels prefer to conduct bunkering at anchor since it saves them from
having to pay additional moorage fees.
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Generally, the receipt of fuels takes a secondary role to the transfer of cargo,
therefore, vessels prefer to take care of cargo operations, then move to anchor to load
bunkers. Since PortlandN ancouver is the largest loading port, it has the
correspondingly highest bunker activity, followed by Longview and eventually Astoria.
Portland has no anchorages due to the constricted channel in the Willamette, therefore,
all vessels bunkering in Portland do so at a terminal following cargo operations. The
chart below depicts the locations vessels receive bunker fuels, which functions as a
"movement out of state" to the oil budget.
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1992-1994).

While all vessels receiving bunker fuels represent a movement of oil, it is
apparent that significant differences exist in where they receive those fuels. Such
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differences may not signify a critical element of the oil budget, but they offer
information on the environmental risk involved per location, and the economic
importance of various locations along the Columbia River.
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RISK FROM SHIPPING

Environmental Risk
The environmental risk from shipping manifests itself in the form of spills
subsequent to groundings, collisions, and transfer operations. Oregon's largest historic
spills have all been from vessels. The first major waterborne spill was the 1978
grounding of the Motor Vessel (MN) Toyota Maru who punctured a fuel tank on the
lower Willamette River with the ship's anchor. This mishap allowed over 30,000
gallons of heavy fuel to spill. Following this was the grounding of the MN Blue
Magpie on north jetty of Yaquina Bay during a storm in 1983. This grounding not only
led to the complete loss of the Blue Magpie, but allowed 80,000 gallons of mixed fuel
products to damage Newport's beaches. The largest spill in Oregon history was the
grounding of the self propelled tank vessel Mobil Oil, which in 1984, ran aground on
Warrior Rock at Sauvie's Island's downstream tip. This navigation error caused the loss
of 225,000 gallons of mixed petroleum products to damage the fragile Columbia River.
Perhaps more frustrating is the effect that offshore shipping may have on
Oregon's environment without even entering the state's territorial sea. Tar balls
routinely wash up on Oregon beaches that are most likely a result of passing ships
cleaning tanks or pumping bilges far out to sea. Such crimes are difficult, if not
impossible to prosecute, as the opportunity to catch such vessels is limited to
crewmember confessions. Also problematic are spills occurring elsewhere that are
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brought to Oregon because of the nearshore current. Fallowing the 1991 Motor Vessel
Tenyo Maru collision off Vancouver, B. C., oil washed up as far south as Lincoln City,
and response crews hastily worked to remove debris before it could become
contaminated as well.
On average, Oregon experiences one large waterborne distribution related spill
annually. Two relatively identical spills occurred almost six months apart in 1993 and
1994. The spills both resulted from bunkering mishaps involving a domestic barge line
and foreign bulk cargo ships. The first spill involved the Motor Vessel Central and
occurred the morning of June 3, 1993. The second spill involved the Motor Vessel An
Ping 6 and occurred the morning of January 10, 1994. Cleanup for the M/V Central
lasted three days, as opposed to cleanup for the MN An Ping 6 which lasted 30 days.
The remarkable difference in the cleanup time required for the spills can be attributed to
the large variability in river discharge. The MN Central spill occurring in early June
with a river discharge of 325,000 cubic feet per second (cfs) stayed largely in the main
channel of the river, avoided large portions of the shoreline, and proceeded downstream
with the current. Consequently the cleanup lasted only three days. The MN An Ping 6
spill, occurring under identical circumstances except sixth months later with a river
discharge of 120,000 cfs, severely polluted the Washington shoreline, required a month
long cleanup and cost significantly more in response. Property claims, although
presently unavailable in detailed form, suggest far greater damages from the MN An
Ping 6 spill as well. The "large spill" for 1995 occurred on August 5, and involved
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2000 gallons of heavy fuel oil being transferred from a barge to an awaiting ship on the
lower Willamette.

Economic Risk
Economic risk from vessels is evident in the lack of control Oregon has over the
international nature of the shipping industry. In addition to the economic risk from
reduced bunkering described earlier, many ships visiting Oregon travel from all over the
world, and are subject to a variety of regulatory regimes. For example, ship operations
are influenced by their flag state, or nation issuing their certification, the port state, in
this case the United States, international maritime rules, and local rules. Therefore, a
tanker visiting Oregon from Washington not only must comply with flag state, port
state, and international regulations, it must also comply with Washington state tanker
regulations. Washington State is presently being sued by the International Tanker
Owners Association (INTERTANKO) for establishing tanker regulations in excess of
federal regulation. One ramification of such regulation is the increased cost of
compliance, which is ultimately passed on to the consumer.
California likewise has tanker regulations which could economically affect
Oregon. Tankers wishing to load products in California (and potentially bound for
Oregon) are required to deploy oil spill containment boom prior to conducting
operations. Such regulations, not federally regulated, make the cost of compliance in
California more expensive. These costs, much like those experienced by tankers
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passing through Washington waters, increase the ultimate cost of such products to
consumers in Oregon.

CHAPTER IV

BULK OIL FACILITIES IN OREGON

OVERVIEW

Bulk oil facilities are the distribution hubs within Oregon's oil budget.
Functioning neither as inputs nor movements, they receive products from a source, store
or blend the products, and distribute them. There are a few facilities, such as pulp and
paper mills or energy facilities, that also receive bulk products, but use them entirely
without distribution. These facilities function as merely oil consumers and are not part
of the distribution system,
As discussed in previous chapters, a typical bulk distribution facility receives its
supply by self propelled tanker, oceangoing barge or pipeline, then distributes that
supply by tank truck, river barge or pipeline.
The lower Willamette River plays home to the majority of bulk facilities in
Oregon. These facilities include companies in the business of distributing oil, pulp and
paper mills receiving heavy fuel oil, and an asphalt refinery. For our purposes, those
involved in the transportation of oil are the most pertinent and have the greatest affect
on Oregon's oil distribution.
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General Relationships

The "input" pipeline to these facilities is the Olympic pipeline from Puget Sound
which supplies them with an average of 6000 barrels of light distillates per hour. The
inputs coming from tankers and barges often carry heavier products that cannot be
pumped through the pipeline. The "movement" pipelines are the Chevron Airport
pipeline and the Santa Fe Pacific pipeline to Eugene which are discussed earlier.
Product not transferred to these pipelines is distributed either by tank trucks to places
such as gas stations, or by barges to ships and other facilities. River barges generally
carry light products up the Columbia River to replenish facilities located in Umatilla,
Pasco, and Clarkston, and bunker barges haul heavy products to ships moored or
anchored in the lower Columbia and Willamette Rivers. Details of these distributions
are available in the barge section of Chapter IV.
Aside from the Columbia/Willamette River system, two facilities serve
Oregon's coast and are located in Coos Bay. One of these facilities stores only heavy
fuels to replenish visiting ships and provide local lumber mills with industrial fuels.
The other facility receives lighter products by barge and distributes them through tank
trucks to gas stations and homes throughout southwestern Oregon.
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TABLE II
BULK OIL FACILITIES RECEIVING IMPORTS IN OREGON

Facility

Location

City

Tanks Volume

Products

Willamette RM 5 Linnton
582,831
Gas, Diesel
ARCO
29
Multnomah chnl
Boise Cascade
St. Helens 1
400,000
Fuel Oil
Willamette
RM
8
179
1,518,146
Portland
Gas,
Dsl, Jet
Chevron
Willamette RM 8 Portland
1,426,464 Charge Stock
Chevron Asphalt
104
Willamette RM 5 Linnton
484,000
Gas, Diesel
GATX
34
GATX (ex "Shell'') Willamette RM 8 Portland
164
616,607
Gas, Diesel
Columbia RM 42 Wauna
1
40,000
James River
Fuel Oil
Columbia RM 13 Astoria
4
100,500
Diesel
McCall
Willamette
Portland
956,150
McCall
25
Gas, Diesel
Willamette RM 5 Linnton
106
267
Gas, Lube
Mobil
Coos Bay 11
66,600
Gas, Diesel
Newport Petroleum Coos RM 12
7
Willamette RM 4 Linnton
91,710
Owens Corning
Asphalt
Willamette RM 6 Linnton
5
270,000
Gas, Diesel
Pacific Northern
Columbia
RM
52
Clatskanie
Portland Gen'/
JO
1,298,000 Diesel
Electric
Willamette RM 8 Portland
15
155, 722
Port of Portland
Fuel Oil
Willamette RM 9 Portland
Texaco
16
424,770
Gas, Diesel
Columbia RM 283 Umatilla
Tidewater
24
207,809
Gas
Willamette RM 3 St. Johns
Time Oil
742,876
33
Gas, Diesel
Willamette RM 5 Linnton
Time Oil
11
319,968
Gas, Diesel
Willamette
RM
8
Portland
26
870,379
Gas, Dsl, Jet
Unocal
Coos RM 13
Coos Bay 12
Unocal
124,862
Gas, Diesel
notes:
"RM" is river mile, measured from the river's mouth upstream to
source.
"Tanks" is the total number of aboveground storage tanks.
Total volumes are listed in barrels. 1 barrel = 42 gallons.
Facilities that are italicized are receptors only of water transported bulk petroleum, not
distribution hubs.
Sources: Oil Spill Contingency Plans for facilities in Oregon.
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Distribution Facilities

Distribution facilities are operated by oil companies in the business of
transporting petroleum products. Such facilities, also called tank farms, consist of
extensive above ground storage tanks, and associated piping and pumps to move the
product. A large berm surrounds these tanks and acts as containment should failures
occur. Generally these facilities offload to truck racks, or a large filling station, where
tank trucks move the fuel to its final destination. These facilities may also offload to
barges or other pipelines for long distance shipments.

Reception Facilities
Facilities that receive products only for their own use are reception facilities.
These are not owned by oil companies, and are typically large industries such as wood
products, paper mills, or electrical generation plants needing vast quantities of
petroleum. These industries may have enormous storage capacities in some cases. The
Portland General Electric generation facility located in Clatskanie has 1.3 million
barrels of diesel fuel kept on reserve should their normal supply of natural gas become
interrupted (Personal communication with PGE facility, March 1995). Such facilities
receive their products by barge alone, since they are not serviced by pipelines, have fuel
needs too big for tank trucks, and are incapable of receiving self propelled tank ships.
Amounts of petroleum delivered to these facilities is therefore accounted for under
"Barge Movements."
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Fhrnre 9. Oil facilities located on the lower Willamette River.
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RISK FROM BULK OIL FACILITIES

Environmental Risk
Tremendous environmental risk exists in the bulk oil facilities since they
represent enormous volumes of petroleum storage in a localized area of the state, and
the failure of any one of them could have severe environmental ramifications. For
example, the Chevron distribution facility has a storage capacity of 63,000,000 gallons
and a catastrophic failure could result in a spill six times as large as the Exxon Valdez.
This risk is made slightly more apparent by the age and location of the facilities
along the lower Willamette River. Many of these facilities have tanks still in use that
were constructed in the 1920s, some of which were built prior to the perfection of
welding technology. Therefore, they are either riveted, or crudely welded, both of
which are susceptible to failure. More importantly, these tank farms are situated on a
portion of the Willamette consisting largely of landfill including sandy dredge spoils,
sawdust, and any other materials early industrialists saw fit to fill in the many "swamps"
bounding the Willamette. Such fill is prone to liquefaction during earthquakes, and
could ultimately lead to total tank failure. The Oregon Emergency Response System
routinely employs this possibility in their annual earthquake exercise.
Operational spills from these facilities are rare since they function as merely
storage receptacles and have few moving parts. A local facility did experience a 5000
gallon heavy fuel oil release November 3, 1995, following the failure of relief valve
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piping. This spill was contained entirely within the bermed area around the tanks and
was quickly remediated.

Economic Risk
These facilities merely function as distribution hubs within the petroleum system
and have no bearing on how much oil is brought into or used by the state. Since these
facilities all lie within Oregon, and are subject to laws administered by the state, we
experience little economic risk. Any changes to their costs of compliance will either be
as a result of federal regulations, which would apply to every state, or state regulation,
which would be self imposed.

Therefo~e,

unlike pipelines and vessels described earlier,

economic risks from facilities, while possible, are largely within the control of Oregon.

CHAPTER V

OIL MOVEMENTS BY TANK TRUCK

OVERVIEW

Oil movements by truck serve as inputs, and movements to Oregon's oil budget.
Inputs include those tank trucks bringing oil into the state from an outside source.
Movements include the many trucks loading petroleum at the bulk facilities mentioned
in the previous chapter. Quantifying the movements of these tank trucks to compare
them to the other portions of the distribution system is difficult. Much of the data
presented comes from a 1987 flow study (Oregon Public Utilities Commission, 1987).
This flow study was conducted by the Public Utility Commission of Oregon and
the Oregon Department of Transportation in response to recommendations put forth by
the Oregon Interagency Hazard Communication Council. The Hazard Communication
Council's report proposed the need to quantify the level ofrisk to Oregon's citizens.
The study's intent, therefore, was to provide information regarding the number and type
of hazardous materials transported on Oregon highways.
To conduct the study, information from the movement of hazardous materials
was gathered at eleven truck weigh scales. The locations included five scales on
Interstates 5 and 84, three on U.S. highways and three on state routes. In surveying the
truck movements, personnel stopped hazard placarded trucks, and examined shipping
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papers for each specific material's name, identification number, quantity, container
type, origin, destination, and routes traveled. The primary materials identified during
the survey included petroleum products, hazardous wastes, sodium hydroxide, paints,
and cleaning compounds. Only the shipments of petroleum products have been
analyzed for the purposes of this research.
The survey was conducted in three phases, with the shipments assessed over a
three day period for each phase.

Movements Within the State
Phase I of the survey, which provides information on movements, included
assessing vehicles passing by the following weigh scales:
Scale

Roadway

Direction of Travel

Woodburn

1-5

South

Wyeth

1-84

East

Scappoose

US30

West

Brightwood

US26

East

Dayton

SR99W

South

Hubbard

SR99E

South

Tillamook

SR6

West

At each site, the survey of movements was conducted for 72 hours. In this
initial phase, the survey was conducted on March 9-11, 1987, at Wyeth (I-84
Eastbound), Scappoose (US30 Westbound), and Dayton (SR99W Southbound). On
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March 16-18, 1987, the survey was conducted at Woodburn (15 Southbound), Hubbard
(SR99W Southbound), Brightwood (US26 Eastbound), and Tillamook (SR6
Westbound). During Phase II, the same survey was repeated, only later in the year. The
March 9-11 survey sites (Wyeth, Scappoose, Dayton) were examined on August 3-5,
1987. The March 16-18 sites (Woodburn, Hubbard, Brightwood, Tillamook) were
examined on August 10-12, 1987. The number of trips, the products transported, and
the locations examined are identified in the following table.
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TABLE III
MONITORING STATIONS FOR OIL MOVEMENTS IN STATE

Station
Wyeth
Eastbound
Scappoose
Westbound
Brightwood
Eastbound
Dayton
Southbound
Hubbard
Southbound
Tillamook
Westbound
Woodburn
Southbound

Trips
Vol
Total
Trips
Vol
Total
Trips
Vol
Total
Trips
Vol
Total
Trips
Vol
Total
Trips
Vol
Total
Trips
Vol
Total

Av
Gas

Diesel

Gasoline

Flam
NOS

43
8429
362447
48
9015
432720
53
8065
427445
33
8041
265353
16
7331
117296
9
9894
89046
126
9223
1162098

3
1284
3852
2
12780
25560

1
5117
5117

0

0

0

0

0

0

0
7
8580
60060

0
4
9968
39872

0

Comb Total
NOS
23
73
3
28011
6759
6422
546139
1554576 19266
26
76
29041
7246
646676
188396
0
36
9
98
6276
6000
20341
225936 54000
707381
22
1
56
6325
8500
22866
139150
413003
11
1
28
5937
6000
19268
65307
6000
188603
4
13
6992
16886
27968
0
117014
69
8
214
7466
6386
41623
515154 51088 1828272

Source: Public Utility Commission, 1987
Notes: "Flam NOS" is flammable cargo not otherwise specified.
"AvGas" is Aviation Gasoline.
"Comb NOS" is combustible cargo not otherwise specified.
Volumes are in gallons.
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To assess the total petroleum related products moved through these survey sites
during a three day period, the information may be summarized as follows:

TABLE IV
TRUCK MOVEMENT SUMMARY TABLE

Location
Wyeth
Scappoose
Brightwood
Dayton
Hubbard
Tillamook
Woodburn
Total/3 days

Trips
73
76
98
56
28
13
214

Volume in Gallons
546139
646676
707381
413003
188603
117014
1828272

Volume/Trip
7481
8508
7218
7375
6735
9001
8543

558

4447088

7969

These figures represent the average of two surveys, each conducted over a three
day period. The volume per trip figure is computed to offer an increased understanding
of the risk presented per truck. This runs from a low of 6735 gallons for trucks
traveling through Hubbard, to a high of 9001 for trucks in Tillamook. Therefore, to
obtain a monthly projection comparable to the pipeline, vessel and barge data, the
figures were multiplied by ten (10) and converted to barrels.
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TABLEV
TRUCK MOVEMENT MONTHLY PROJECTIONS

Location
Wyeth
Scappoose
Brightwood
Dayton
Hubbard
Tillamook
Woodburn

Trips
730
760
980
560
280
130
2,140

Total/month

5,580

Volume
Volume/Trip
Volume
5,461,390
7,481
6,466,760
8,509
7,073,810
7,218
4,130,030
7,375
1,886,030
6,736
1,170,140
9,001
18,282,720
8,543
44,470,880

7,970

Bbls
130,033
153,970
168,424
98,334
44,905
27,860
435,303
1,058,830

These figures are better displayed graphically as follows:
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Figure 10. Monthly projection of tank truck movements in Oregon.
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It is clearly seen that the majority of movement occurs on 15 southbound through
Woodburn. The 2140 trips more than doubles the 980 moving through the next busiest
station in Brightwood. This represents the tank trucks that are transporting products
from the Portland area bulk facilities throughout the rest of the metropolitan region.
However, this figure does not represent the many tank trucks moving products within
the metropolitan region, as many of those vehicles may travel inside the area bounded
by Woodburn, and the adjacent weigh stations. Therefore, the study fails to accurately
assess the amount of trips moving within the Portland region. Estimates for this amount
are made in Chapter VII.
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Movements into the State
Phase III of the study was completed to assess hazardous material movements
entering Oregon from adjacent states. This phase utilized port of entry scales in the
following locations:
Station

Roadway

Direction of Travel

Ashland

15

North

Klamath Falls

US97

North

Ontario

184

East

Ostrander, WA

15

South

Surveys at these sites were conducted November 17-19. The Ashland and
Klamath Falls sites were chosen to assess traffic entering Oregon from California and
Nevada. The Ontario site was chosen to assess traffic entering Oregon from Idaho. The
Ostrander, WA, site was chosen to assess traffic entering Oregon from Washington.
These sites were not without their limitations. The Ashland, Klamath Falls, and
Ontario sites are all located some distance within the Oregon border. Therefore, surveys
conducted here excluded shipments terminating in locations prior to the weigh station.
Furthermore, it is difficult to conclude that the Klamath Falls survey station assessed
traffic movements from Nevada since US97 leads from northern California into Oregon.
The Ostrander, WA, site was also not without its shortcomings. It is located 50 miles
north of Portland, as well as north of Kelso and Longview, WA. Therefore, shipments
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originating in these cities, both of which maintain bulk oil and chemical facilities,
would not be included in the study.
Surveys conducted led to the following data:

TABLE VI
MONITORING STATIONS FOR OIL INPUTS INTO OREGON

Gasoline

Station
Klamath Falls
Northbound
Ontario
Westbound
Ostrander, WA
Southbound
Ashland
Northbound

Trips
Vol
Total
Trips
Vol
Total
Trips
Vol
Total
Trips
Vol
Total

Flam
NOS

2
4806
9612
0
1
3
4018
6000
12054
6000
5
3
10696 6475
53480 19425
17
19
7544
4878
128248 92682

Av Gas

0

0
14
10005
140070

0

Diesel
5
3030
15150
2
8100
16200

13
6299
81887

Comb Total
NOS
1
8
11236
3400
28162
3400
2
8
6831
24949
13662
47916
3
25
6886
34062
20658
233633
54
5
12000
30721
60000
362817

Source: Public Utility Commission, 1987
Notes: "Flam NOS" is flammable cargo not otherwise specified.
''AvGas" is Aviation Gasoline.
"Comb NOS" is combustible cargo not otherwise specified.
Volumes are in gallons.

Since only one period of three days was used, no averaging was conducted when
assimilating the data. The above figures can be summarized into a three day total as
follows:
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TABLE VII
TRUCK INPUT SUMMARY TABLE

Location
Klamath Falls
Ontario
Ostrander
Ashland

8
8
25
54

Volume in gals
28162
47916
233633
362817

Volume/Trip
3520
5990
9345
6719

95

672528

7079

Trips

Total/3 days

The volume per trip figure is computed to offer an increased understanding of
the risk presented per truck. This runs from a low of 3520 gallons for trucks in Klamath
Falls, to a high of 9345 gallons for trucks traveling through Ostrander. This volume in
Ostrander represents the highest per trip amount throughout the study. These figures,
like the truck movement information, were multiplied by ten and converted to barrels to
make average monthly projections comparable to the vessel and barge data:

TABLE VIII
TRUCK INPUT MONTHLY PROJECTIONS

Location
Klamath Falls
Ontario
Ostrander
Ashland
Total/month

Trips
80
80
250
540
950

Volume
Volume/Trip
Volume Bbls
281,620
3,520
6,705
479,160
5,990
11,409
2,336,330
9,345
55,627
3,628,170
6,719
86,385
6,725,280

7,079

160,126
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The movements of petroleum through these towns can better be displayed as
graphically. Klamath Falls and Ontario receive a similar number of tank trucks
monthly, however, those passing through Ontario carry almost twice the amount of
petroleum.
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11. Monthly projection of tank truck entries into Oregon.

The majority of movements occur on Interstate 5 northbound through Ashland
with 540 monthly trips. However, as discussed earlier, some petroleum inputs
terminating south of this port of entry may not be included in the study.
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+ Stations Monitoring Truck Movements

9

Stations Monitoring Truck Inputs

Fillure 12. Monitoring stations for tank truck movements in Oregon.
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RISK FROM TANK TRUCKS

Environmental Risk
Although tank trucks, generally carrying less than 10,000 gallons, represent the
smallest potential spill, on a per-incident basis they pose the greatest environmental risk
to petroleum distribution. The Office of State Fire Marshal, in its 1994 Annual Report
of Hazardous Material Incidents in Oregon, indicated that 184 spills involving
petroleum tank trucks occurred, of which 77 involved diesel and 66 involved gasoline.
These spills totaled 7392 gallons, or an average of 51 gallons per incident.
Spill risk from the other potential sources (pipelines, ships, barges, and
railroads) are all limited to particular geographic corridors. For example, any spill from
the Santa Fe Pacific pipeline will occur within the right of way secured by the pipeline,
and spreading could be predicted by the topography, proximity to water, and substrate
material. Likewise any spill from an oil barge will occur within the waterbody used by
that barge. Tank trucks, on the other hand, travel to the remotest comers of the state,
and spills from their accidents can pollute pavement, roads, wetlands, ditches, streams,
or any combination. This will only become more apparent as Oregon's population
increases in areas such as Bend not served by other petroleum distribution modes.
Furthermore, tank trucks carry all grades of petroleum products, including everything
from light distillates to asphalt, so planning for their response is difficult.
Response to releases from tank trucks is often conducted differently from other
sources. Since spills from tank trucks generally impede traffic, the primary response is
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to restore the roadway to its unimpeded condition as expeditiously as possible.
Unfortunately, this at times leads to the hosing down of polluted roadways into storm or
other drains which ultimately harm the environment. This contrasts with spills from
other transportation modes which often damage areas unseen by the general public.
Therefore, response protocols in these areas examine the environment's ability to
recover, and serve to enhance that ability. This often means taking litle or no action and
allowing natural processes to degrade the petroleum. For example, gasoline spilled by a
tank truck on a roadway poses a threat to public safety and impedes the orderly
movement of traffic. This gasoline is removed by the most expeditious means, often
high volume flushing, without regard to its fate or downstream environmental
consequence. A similar spill of gasoline in a tank farm would be allowed to aerate in
the tank farm until the light ends have evaporated and the product poses no safety or
toxic threat.

Economic Risk
The majority of tank trucks serving Oregon operate wholly within the state.
They are therefore subject to economic burdens, such as the petroleum load fee for the
highway fund, placed upon them by state regulations. Any economic risk Oregon sees
from this is self imposed, rather than a ramification from international or adjacent state
policies. We do however, receive tank trucks that are importing products from
Washington and California. Such trucks would be subject to those state regulations, and
the corresponding costs of compliance, as well. For example, were California to impose
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a high petroleum distribution fee on tank trucks, then those providing inputs to Ashland
or Klamath Falls, may pass that economic burden on to their customers. This places
those customers at some level of economic risk and should this burden exceed that
amount which those customers are willing to pay, the distribution system would have to
adjust for supply shortfalls.

CHAPTER VI

RAILROADS IN OREGON

OVERVIEW

Oregon enjoys an extensive railroad system providing coverage to most portions
of the state. However, no bulk petroleum is transported by rail and it therefore
functions as neither an input, nor movement to the oil distribution system. This chapter
briefly describes the routes of major rail service throughout Oregon.
The major rail lines serving Oregon include the Southern Pacific, Union Pacific,
and Burlington Northern. Southern Pacific operates primarily north-south with a line
from Portland to Springfield. This line then forks into three. One travels to the western
edge of Oregon along State Route 26 then moves south into Coos County terminating in
Myrtle Point. The middle fork continues from Springfield along I5 south to California.
The eastern fork travels along State Route 58 into Klamath Falls and then into
California.
Union Pacific operates a major east-west route departing Portland and traveling
through the Columbia River Gorge, where it branches in Hermiston. Here, one line
travels north into Washington, while the other continues southerly and eventually exits
the state in Ontario.
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Burlington Northern operates a north-south line beginning in Astoria, then
traveling southeast along State Route 30 into Portland. This eventually follows the
Southern Pacific leg south to Springfield. A separate leg of Burlington Northern begins
at a junction with Union Pacific east of the Dalles, then travels south along State Route
97 through Bend, where it eventually joins Southern Pacific in Chemult.
Smaller lines (termed "shortlines") are operated by the Willamette Valley
Railroad, Klamath Northern, Union Rail of Oregon, Port of Tillamook, Lake County
operated by Great Western, Willamina and Grand Ronde, Oregon Pacific and Eastern,
East Portland Traction, City of Prineville, Longview Portland, Mount Hood, and
Oregon Eastern.
Railroads are utilized for shipments of hazardous materials and small quantities
of oil products. These movements were reported to the public utilities commission in
1992. Reports included products moved by Standard Transportation Commodity Code
(STCC) and amounts moved but were only detailed to the extent they inform the Public
Utilities Commission of general types of products moved. More detailed reports,
although useful, would apparently give away excessive business information, and are
not submitted (Personal communication with Public Utilities Commission, May 1995).
Bulk oil movements are not conducted by railroad in Oregon. Southern Pacific
Railroad maintains oil product storage facilities at rail terminals in Eugene, Portland,
and Klamath Falls, yet all are inactive (ODOE, 1992). Although rail transport is less
expensive than truck transport, it is not used for several reasons. Rail transport
represents defined, limited access distribution capabilities. Many of the population and
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high use centers served by rail are also served by either barge or pipeline--both of which
offer a cheaper alternative. Areas not served by barge or pipeline but by rail usually do
not have the demand for such large shipments and their needs can be met by tank truck
(Personal communication w/ GA TX, May 1995). Therefore, railroads, like cargo ships,
are heavy users of petroleum, but do not participate in its distribution.
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Fi2ure 13. Routes of major railroads operating in Oregon.
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RISK FROM RAILROADS

Environmental Risk
Since railroads carry no bulk petroleum as cargo, their enviromnental risk is
reduced. However, railroads carry tremendous volumes of diesel for the operation of
their own engines. Generally, each locomotive carries a 3100 gallon "saddle tank" to
provide that engine with fuel. For long hauls, this saddle tank is augmented by a tank
car that can refuel the locomotive.
Railroads are often situated adjacent to river beds. While such positioning
provides a flat track surface, it renders them susceptible to flood and ground movement
risk. Compounding this risk is the exposure seen by the stream or riparian areas when
spills from locomotives occur.
Oregon's largest railroad spill occurred after the 1993 Southern Pacific train
derailment into outside of Eugene. This derailment allowed 6100 gallons of diesel fuel
to enter Yoncalla Creek, threatening a local water drinking water reservoir and the
federally protected Western Pond Turtle. Cleanup lasted nearly one month and included
the use of skimming equipment, oil absorbent materials, monitoring wells, and auxiliary
water supplies.

Economic Risk
Economic risk from railroads does not figure into Oregon's oil budget since they
are presently not utilized. Were railroads to be used in the distribution process, risk
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would be evident given the interstate nature of the railroads, and the opportunity for
price influences from adjacent states.

CHAPTER VII

TRANSPORT COMPARISONS

Normalizing data from pipelines, self propelled tank ships, barges, and tank
trucks presented in the previous chapters to fit a barrels per month standard allows for a
comparison of modes. Such a comparison provides an "average month snapshot" of
petroleum distribution in Oregon.
TABLE IX
MONTHLY OIL DISTRIBUTION AVERAGES BY
TRANSPORTATION MODE IN OREGON

Transport Mode
Tank Truck
Tank Truck
Oil Pipeline
Oil Pipeline
Self Propelled Tank.ship
Self Propelled Tank.ship
Oil Barge (to Coos Bay)
Oil Barge (to Columbia)
Oil Barge (to Upriver)
Oil Barge (Bunkering)
Totals

Trips

Input
Trips
Movement
Bbls/Month
Bbls/Month
950
160,125
5580
1,058,830
1
3,816,666
1,650,000
2
10
1, 754,416
2
8

33,250
240,000
65
75
6,004,457

1,486,916
569,500
4,765,246
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The difference between Input Barrels per Month and Movement Barrels per
Month is 1,239,211 barrels. This is not an amount that keeps piling up in Portland
month after month. Rather, this amount accounts for that not counted during the truck
distribution study, which only monitored petroleum movements outside the
metropolitan area. Given Oregon's population distribution, it can be assumed with
relative confidence that this surplus is being moved along the metro area roadways to
supply home oil tanks, gasoline stations, boat marinas, industries, and other users.
This information summary should be useful to energy planners, risk analysts,
and businesses, and citizens interested in petroleum distribution in our state, as well as
planning for future distribution challenges. Viewed as a map, the results better show
that the various components must be linked to function as a system and serve Oregon's
citizens.
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The make up of this summary may change in the upcoming years with the
proposed development of Olympic Pipeline Company's Cross-Cascades Pipeline. This
220 mile underground pipeline will deliver 65,000 barrels daily of motor gasoline,
diesel fuel and aviation fuel from Western Washington refineries to Central and Eastern
Washington (Olympic Pipeline Company News Release 1995). The proposal also
includes a truck distribution terminal near Ellensburg and several small pump stations
along the route. When complete in 1998, this will not only alter the movement of
barges to these upriver locations, it may also alter the products flowing through the
existing Olympic pipeline to Portland.
Some Washington environmental organizations fear this pipeline may one day
turn Puget Sound into a major oil port. Presently Puget Sound refineries are supplying
Washington and Oregon with much of their fuel needs. When this pipeline is complete,
it will have the capability of linking with the existing Chevron Utah Pipeline which
originates in the Rangely oil field in northwestern Colorado. Such a link may allow the
Chevron Utah pipeline to carry products backward from its original design and move
them from Pasco, WA, to Salt Lake City instead of vice versa. This operation would
increase the demand for crude oil shipments to the Puget Sound refineries. As these
shipments increase, so does the environmental risk to Puget Sound waters.
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In addition to understanding the micro supply and distribution systems in
Oregon, it is also worthwhile to understand a few elementary facts regarding the macro
system in the United States to appreciate the risks posed by world events. In 1993, the
United States imported 3, 111,990,000 barrels of oil or roughly half of its petroleum
needs. The remainder was produced domestically, primarily by Texas, Alaska,
California, Louisiana and Oklahoma who combined to produce 2,494,674,000 barrels
(API Basic Petroleum Data Book, Jan 1995). Of the imported oil, the vast majority (or
2,972,000 barrels per day) came from Latin American countries--principally Venezuela
and Mexico. The Middle East provided 1,852,000 barrels per day, West Africa
(primarily Nigeria) provided 1,311,000 barrels per day, and Canada provided 1, 175,000
barrels per day (Energy Information Administration, 1994).
Based upon 1993 data, Texas provides the single largest input to the U.S.
oil budget, at 752,282,000 barrels, followed by Alaska with 577,494,000 and Saudi
Arabia with 467,753,000 barrels. Venezuela surpassed Saudi Arabia in June of 1994 as
the primary foreign supplier of oil to the United States. The following graph depicts the
role played by various states and countries in the 1993 U. S. oil budget.
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Figure 15. Top 10 suppliers of oil to the U. S. oil budget in 1993. Sources
are split almost exactly between domestic supplies and imports (Source:
API Basic Petroleum Data Book, Jan 1995).
This graph offers a clear view of the risk, or how vulnerable, the United States is
to particular world events. For example, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait had little, if any
effect on our nation's present oil budget. However, economic or cultural problems in
Latin America would have much more serious ramifications since Venezuela and
Mexico combine to provide eighteen percent of our national needs. Perhaps
overshadowing these is the dependence the United States has on the enormous roles
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played by Texas and Alaska, which both out supply Saudi Arabia and satisfy one third
of U. S. needs.
As it relates to Oregon, we are extremely dependent upon the resources of
Alaska, which make their way to us via California and Washington. However, we do
not rely upon the supplies from Texas or the Midwest. Severe changes to the supplies
available from Alaska may affect how oil is supplied and priced in Oregon.

CHAPTER VIII

UNDERSTANDING AND MANAGING RISK

The amount of risk experienced by a state fluctuates with the level of resource
activity within that state. Timber provides a good example of this for Oregon, where
the state has long enjoyed a healthy integrated industry from extraction to production to
distribution. The rewards of such control allowed Oregonians to enjoy low lumber
prices, abundant supplies, and healthy job markets, but the drawbacks are becoming
evident in clear cut forests, damaged ecosystems, and silted streams. As the available
timber declines, so do the employment opportunities for loggers.
Likewise, "oil states" such as Alaska and Texas with primary petroleum
industries such as extraction, may experience little economic risk because of their
indigenous supply, but greater environmental risk associated with removing
hydrocarbons from the ground. States such as Washington with secondary petroleum
industries such as refining experience slightly less environmental risk since drilling and
extraction do not exist, but live with environmental threats from the operation of major
refiners. Conversely, they should be able to partially shield themselves from price
increases as they can purchase crude oils on the spot market. States such as Oregon,
involved in tertiary petroleum activities such as distribution do not realize the same
environmental risk as those that are refining or extracting, but should experience greater
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economic risk with the reliance on petroleum exports from adjacent states. It is only
through understanding this risk that it can be managed.

ENVIRONMENTAL RISK

Since Oregon's involvement in petroleum includes no primary nor secondary
industries, the majority of environmental risk comes from transportation. Oregon, like
all states, is polluted daily by unintended transportation-related releases. Quantifying
these releases becomes problematic for several reasons. Spills to surface water are
reported to the U.S. Coast Guard in Washington D. C., which maintains a nationwide
database. Often these spills receive no response as cleanup becomes unfeasible given
the swift currents of the Columbia and Willamette Rivers.
In addition to federal notification, all spills are reported to the Oregon
Emergency Response System (OERS) in Salem, which acts as a clearinghouse for initial
notification. This would seemingly be a good source of annual spill data, however,
OERS consolidates all petroleum and hazardous material spills together into hazardous
substances, and it is therefore impossible to extract meaningful information regarding
petroleum distribution. This is compounded with the fact that their volume estimates
are based purely on initial reports, which often vary from the final assessment.
Transportation related incidents are included in the Office of the State Fire
Marshal's annual report of Hazardous Material Incidents in Oregon. This summation
stems from the reports made to them throughout the year by responsible parties,
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concerned citizens, law enforcement personnel, and accident victims, and does the most
thorough job of assessing the daily losses of petroleum from land-based-distribution
related spills. Data from 1994 indicated that 184 spills from tank trucks involving
petroleum products occurred, of which 77 involved diesel and 66 involved gasoline.
These spills totaled 7392 gallons, or 616 gallons (14.6 barrels) per month (Office of
State Fire Marshal, 1994 Annual Report of Hazardous Material Incidents in Oregon).
Based upon this data, one transportation related petroleum spill occurs every two days
in Oregon, releasing 20 gallons (.5 barrel). These releases are not included in the oil

distribution budget as they are already accounted for when they are transferred to a tank
truck, pipeline, or barge. Assessing the "seriousness" of these spills is challenging as
explained below.
Assessing the "seriousness," or level of environmental consequence, is often
difficult. In the most economic sense it is conducted through natural resource damage
assessments, which are historically based upon contingent valuation methods. Such
methods assess a value to injured species based upon market prices, public perceptions,
and scientific bases for their "worth." Easy valuations can be made for market species
(e.g. salmon) noticeably damaged and easily understood by the general populace. The
contingent valuation method has more difficulty assessing the worth of non-market
species (e.g. nutria) and relies on questionnaires for value estimation.
Outside of the natural resource damage assessment process, the level of
environmental consequence is simply a function of the oil type and size and the
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characteristics of the affected ecosystem. When oil is released to the environment, its
characteristics determine how it experiences spreading, evaporation, dispersion,
emulsification, dissolution, oxidation, sedimentation, and biodegradation.
The oil type will determine if it is a non-persistent oil, which is composed of
light petroleum fractions and will tend to dissipate rapidly from the surface, or a
persistent oil such as residual fuel oil which will dissipate more slowly. The main
physical properties which affect the behavior of spilled oil are its specific gravity,
distillation characteristics, viscosity and pour point. Oils with a low specific gravity
such as gasoline are non- persistent and readily incorporated into the environment, yet
pose acute toxic threats to animals coming in contact. Persistent oils, generally with
high specific gravities, do not provide the same toxic affects to animals, but remain in
the ecosystem longer and pose mechanical threats such as matting of feathers or fur.
Spill size will have a direct relation on the environment's ability to assimilate the
pollutant.
Ecosystem characteristics determining the "seriousness" of a spill include the
resident species and their sensitivity to hydrocarbons and the level of natural activity
from winds, waves and surface runoff. A little oil in a sensitive area can do as much
harm as a large quantity on a desolate rocky shore. The tanker Braer spill occurring off
the Shetlands dumped five times the amount of crude oil than the Exxon Valdez, yet did
so in a high energy environment along a rocky shoreline. Cleanup lasted but a few days
as the oil was assimilated into the environment through dispersion, dissolution and
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evaporation, and follow-up bioassays indicate little damage. Cleanup for the Exxon
Valdez spill lasted over two years and is still being evaluated for long term affects.
Given this, quantifying the "seriousness" of tank truck spills in Oregon becomes
perplexing, although it can be approximated that the 7000 gallons spilled annually poses
no significant long term threat to the health of Oregonians or the environment when
compared with the many other pollutant sources.

ECONOMIC RISK

Economic risk refers to the opportunity for a commodity's price or supply to
fluctuate in response to forces beyond Oregon's control. Since Oregon has little control
over its inputs of petroleum, economic risk is prevalent. Also part of economic risk is
the employment risk associated with extractive (primary) industries reliant upon natural
resources., As described in the logging example at the beginning of this chapter,
primary industry employment fluctuates with the level of natural resource supply.
Secondary industries, such as saw mills or oil refineries, are better suited to shield
themselves from this employment risk by securing outside supplies of natural resources.

Supply Risk

Following World War II, Oregonians decided to renew their interest in securing
a domestic source of petroleum. As part of this renewed interest, Chester Sterrett,
Manager of the Industries Department of the Portland Chamber of Commerce,
completed a study on the fuel oil requirements of Oregon and Southern Washington.
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Many of the figures determined by Sterrett are meaningless today given the regions
economic and population growth, but many of his ideas ring true.
In 1950, all of the fuel used in the lower Columbia River area was brought in
from California tankers. The Portland area suffered restricted deliveries of fuel during
the previous decade, primarily on account of the demand from war industries. Sterrett,
desiring fuel shortages to be a thing of the past, reported, "On account of increased
industrialization of the Pacific Northwest, the whole economy of the region would be
disrupted if supply of fuel were cut off or reduced." He continued, "One thing is
certain: the lower Columbia River area, for maximum safety and future industrial
growth, must encourage, as soon as possible, fuel supply sources other than offshore
tanker supply" (Sterrett, 1950, p. 5).
His pleas were not only heard, but met in the development of the Olympic
Pipeline in the mid 1960s. This pipeline is not immune to fluctuations in the world
petroleum supply, however. The OPEC oil embargo of the mid 1970s created
worldwide shortages. Since petroleum is a world commodity, even nations and states
with domestic sources of oil were affected. The following graph shows Olympic
pipeline activity in the 1970s.
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Figure 16. Olympic Oil Pipeline Activity 1972-1976 (Source: Oregon
Department of Transportation, 1979).

Although it does not appear there was a significant change during the mid 1970s
embargo, when the barrels are examined as a percentage change from year to year, the
severity of the embargo is more evident. The following graph shows the decrease in oil
movements in 1974, which followed on the heels of a increase the previous years.
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17. Olympic Pipeline Activity Displayed in Percentage Change
1972-1976 (Source: Oregon Department of Transportation, 1979).

During this period the Chevron pipeline in Eastern Oregon was also providing
inputs into Oregon's oil budget on the average of 1500 barrels annually. However,
these inputs were not enough to alter the change seen in the 1974 figures.
Seven states actually increased their consumption during this period. Alaska,
Connecticut, Hawaii, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Wyoming consumed more petroleum
in 1974 than in the previous year. Of those seven, all but Connecticut and Hawaii have
extensive petroleum reserves, and shielded themselves from necessary cutbacks using
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their indigenous supplies and refining capabilities. Connecticut and Hawaii somehow
managed to secure reliable sources of supply in the face of the embargo.

Price Risk
The 1974 oil crisis not only altered the amount of oil entering Oregon, it also
affected its price. A gallon of gasoline cost thirty-five cents throughout the early 1970s,
and quickly increased to fifty-one cents in 1974. This pattern was evident in Portland,
as well as other West Coast cities, and the United States. From 1974 on, the price
continued to gradually increase, although not at the rate it did during the OPEC
embargo.
Twenty years later, changes still occur following a significant "petroleum related
event." Gasoline prices typically fluctuate with the driving season, which is defined as
mid-summer through Labor Day. These fluctuations are simply a case of supply versus
demand, as can be seen in home heating oil prices, which increase during the winter, but
are held low throughout the remaining year. Several "petroleum related events" provide
evidence of the price vulnerability of the oil industry, and how consumers become
affected by events that appear completely unrelated to them. Often, the magnitude of
the petroleum involved is unrelated to the magnitude of the price change. Rather the
magnitude of the price change may be related to media coverage, public interest, market
opportunity.
The grounding of the Exxon Valdez occurred in late March 1989, and prices
increased not only on the west coast, but throughout the United States. Although most
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portions of the United States do not receive a drop of Alaskan oil, consumer prices were
still affected. Later that year an Exxon refinery in Louisiana suffered a catastrophic
explosion, killing two, and forcing evacuations. A small spike in the U.S. price
occurred, although the west, which already had its share of Exxon news, appeared
unaffected. Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait the following summer, and as it appeared
he was going to control Kuwaiti oil, prices shot up throughout the U.S. and the West
Coast, even though the West Coast receives not a drop of Middle Eastern crude. Once
the U.S. invaded the Persian Gulf and removed Iraqi troops, prices quickly fell.
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Figure 18. Gasoline prices were affected to greater degrees depending
upon the nature of "petroleum related" casualty. The Exxon Valdez spill
forced prices up across the United States. A swift victory in the Persian
Gulf by U.S. Forces led to a rapid decline in prices throughout the U.S.
even though much of the country receives no oil from that region (Source
U.S. Federal Highway Administration).

While Oregon may experience supply risk as a result of its lack of crude oil, it
does not appear vulnerable to price risk brought on by world or local events any greater
than the states on the upstream end of its oil supplies.
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ECONOMICS VERSUS ENVIRONMENT

Supply obviously affects the level of risk experienced economically and
environmentally. Depending upon the individual, low economic risk with high
environmental risk may be acceptable. In other words, some may prefer the threat of oil
well blowouts and crude oil

spill~

to the benefits secure oil sources and prices.

For straight production, Texas tops the list today at 619,088,000 barrels of oil
produced during 1993. Following in descending order are Alaska (577,494,000),
California (293,089,000), Louisiana (138,673,000), and Oklahoma (96,624,000).
Louisiana's respectable 138,673,000 barrels in 1993, or roughly twice the needs of
Oregon, represented a sharp decrease from the previous year, when they produced
420,555,000 barrels, or seven times the needs of Oregon. Trends such as this increase
Louisiana's employment risk.
Reserves of oil are extremely important. Texas also leads the U.S. in total
reserves with 6,171,000,000 barrels confirmed in 1993. Rounding out the list are
Alaska, California, Louisiana, and Oklahoma (API Basic Petroleum Data Book, 1995).
Alaska has a reserve situated under the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge which would
bolster its total to well above that of Texas. However, permission to extract the reserves
has not been granted because of environmental considerations and risks.
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Worldwide Price Comparisons
Overall, motor gasoline taxes in the United States are extremely low. Even with
the average state tax included, the U. S. tax on a gallon of gasoline is one seventh that of
Japan, or one tenth that of Germany. The following figure depicts this disparity.
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Figure 19. Tax price per gallon assessed in major countries of the world.
Prices are in U.S. dollars using recent conversion factors (Source:
Federal Highway Administration Monthly Reports from States, July
1995).

Such tax disparities give quick confirmation the U.S. governments desire to
keep motor gasoline a cheap energy source. Such policies may undermine the incentive
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for alternative fuel and alternative transportation developments. Outside of the United
States, the rights to oil are normally vested in the state. This means that the right to
explore requires some form of grant or consent from the state in which the rights have
been vested. (Jones, 1988) Since no such policies exist within the United States,
petroleum exploration and production is strictly profit driven, and low taxes are deemed
necessary to keep profits high and encourage oil development.

Local Price Comparisons
The low economic risks are rarely passed on to consumers in the form of low
prices. Oregon's state motor gasoline tax rate is 24 cents per gallon. This is added to a
federal gasoline tax of 18.4 cents. Along the West Coast, the Washington and
California state gas taxes are 23 cents and 18 cents respectively. Connecticut leads the
nation with the highest rate of 32 cents per gallon and Georgia anchors the list with 7.5
cents per gallon. The national average is 20 cents per gallon (Federal Highway
Administration Monthly Motor Fuel Reports by State, July 1995).
Given this, one would expect a gallon of gasoline in Oregon to cost more than
that same gallon in Washington. Not only is the state tax higher, but self serve gasoline
is prohibited in Oregon, and the fuel must be transported by one of the modes described
earlier. Gasoline prices for a major city in each state were monitored and published
until 1977 by a private concern. When the private concern ceased, the Federal Highway
Administration began collecting the same information except on a major population
center basis. Therefore, information exists for areas such as New York City, Los
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Angeles, Chicago, Dallas, and Washington D.C. Unfortunately, pricing information
was not maintained for smaller areas such as Portland or Seattle. The information for
areas such as these could be approximated based upon Department of Labor statistics
and their consumer price indexing. For western states, the consumer price index is
limited to category A (small) cities, or category C (large cities).
Beginning in January 1994, data collection on a per state basis commenced
again, and is purchased from a private concern by the Federal Highway Administration.
This data allows for a comparison of recent prices in Oregon and Washington for not
only gasoline, but home heating oil as well.
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Figure 20. Price per gallon (excluding taxes) for motor gasoline and
home heating oil for Oregon and Washington January 1994 - present
(Source: Federal Highway Administration Monthly State Summaries
July 1995, and National Petroleum News June 1995).

Gasoline and home heating oil play very different roles in petroleum economics.
Gasoline accounts for almost half of all products sold, and is subject to the finest in
marketing efforts available. Home heating oil is sold in smaller quantities each year as
houses to convert to other forms of heat. It also is not marketed by major oil companies
with any of the consumer based effort that motor gasoline is subject to. The information
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in the graph above suggests that not only does distribution play a minor role in the
pricing of oil products, but demand serves as the overriding factor. This is evident in
the very deliberate price fluctuations of home heating oil, and the distinct decrease
during summer months, followed by the winter increase. Perhaps more interesting is
the price difference between motor gasoline in Oregon and Washington, which indicates
that this product is similarly priced in both states, even though greater distribution and
labor costs are incurred in Oregon.
These pricing figures indicate that oil prices do not adhere to local differences
between source and use. Rather oil is a worldwide commodity, and crude prices are
affected in response to many activities. Such responses keep "oil states" from enjoying
the low prices typically associated with indigenous supplies, and allows "non-oil states"
such as Oregon, to enjoy similarly priced petroleum. This further benefits "non-oil
states" in that they do not have to live with environmental risk associated with the
primary extractive industries. In other words, Oregon gets to enjoy petroleum products
at the same, if not lower, prices as states who control their entire supplies, yet is not
burdened with the environmental risks of extraction and production. This appears to be
a favorable position for Oregon or similar states.
The distribution systems detailed in this analysis are not static, and outside
forces such as the export of Alaska North Slope Crude oil, the increased exploration of
the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge or California offshore oil fields, and the future
development of a cross-Cascades pipeline may all serve to alter this scheme.
Oregonians can ensure the most efficient, effective reliable and safe petroleum
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distribution systems only through a comprehensive understanding of how we get oil
from source to use. A geographical analysis provides this understanding.
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